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With hindsight, 1958 emerges as a remarkable year in the recent  
history of Anglo-American ethics. It was, on the one hand, the year in 
which Kurt  Baier published The Moral Point of View, a book that 
helped to reestablish a modern tradition in moral philosophy that had 
been derailed somewhat following Moore.  On the other, 1958 was the 
year in which G. E. M. Anscombe fired her famous broadside against 
the modern  tradition in ethics. 'Modern Moral Philosophy', the lead 
piece in Philosophy for that year, announced that the very notions 
moral philosophers had made central since the eighteenth century, 
" the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral 
duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the 
moral sense of 'ought ' ,  ought  to be jettisoned if this is psychologically 
possible". L 
Just the title of Baier's book was enough to place it squarely within 
the tradition Anscombe wanted to attack. Indeed, it helped to return 
to currency the idea that morality has a characteristic point of view, a 
perspective from which its distinctive notions - moral obligation, 
moral goodness, and so on - are appropriately recognized and ap- 
preciated. And it gave the perspective a name that has stuck. 
Anscombe,  of course, did not deny that morality involves a charac- 
teristic way of viewing human conduct  and character.  She denied that 
it is a defensible way. Her  thesis was that moral notions are simply 
incoherent  without the obsolete premise of divine law. What is dis- 
tinctive about morality is the idea of a way of being bound, of moral 
obligation, which makes no sense a ta l t  without the idea of law, with its 
associated notions of responsibility, guilt, and so on, in the back- 
ground. But the sort of law required could not be an earthly posit. It 
could only issue, she argued, from a divine legislator. 
Morality involves a "law conception of ethics",  and "it  is not 
possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a 
lawgiver". 2 Without this assumption the very idea of morality, the 
notion of a distinctive and authoritative kind of obligation, con- 
sideration, motivation, "ought" ,  and so on, is purely vestigial and 
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unsupported. "[T]hey are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, 
from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally sur- 
vives, and are only harmful without i t " .  3 If only it were possible, 
morality should be abolished. 
Baier's thesis could hardly have been more starkly opposed. To the 
claim that morality is based only on superstition, he replied that it can 
be given a rational basis. The notions of right and wrong do require 
the idea of rule or "law", as Anscombe had claimed, but the requisite 
law is not divine. What is needed is the idea of a rule that is 
"universally teachable" and whose "[o]bservation is for the good of 
everyone alike". 4 If this is what morality is, if moral obligations are so 
conceived that it is in the interest of everyone alike that they be 
regarded as authoritative, then morality has a rational basis - moral- 
ity's authority derives from reason's. Far from resting on superstition, 
morality is a construction of practical reason. 
With this argument, The Moral Point of View helped to recapture a 
tradition looking backward to Hobbes, Kant, Hume on the artificial 
virtues, and Mill on justice, right, and wrong. And, in so doing, it 
helped to make possible further developments of this line in Rawls, 
Brandt, Gauthier, and Scanlon, among others. 5 
In the years since 1958 the central concepts of morality, and 
philosophical attempts to articulate systematic views utilizing them, 
have hardly vanished from the scene. Far from it. The last twenty-five 
years have seen a period of remarkably vigorous and fruitful moral 
philosophizing, perhaps as fruitful as any in this century. But if the 
tradition represented by Kurt Baler has flourished in the last genera- 
tion, it must also be recognized that an increasing number of writers 
have wanted to prune it back in various ways, and for various reasons. 
The philosophers I have in mind are not those whose disagreement 
with Baier has simply concerned, say, the role of rules within a theory 
of right, or, perhaps, the publicity condition. Act-consequentialists, for 
example, still share the project of a theory of right, of moral obliga- 
tion, even if they differ about details. 6 The writers I have in mind do 
not. They have thought, at the very least, thatmodern moral philoso- 
phy has been much too focused on notions of moral obligation, right, 
and wrong. 
Some have argued that the virtues and moral emotions are more 
central to the moral life than can possibly be appreciated so long as 
one concentrates on obligation. Among other things, moral obligation 
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is typically thought to concern specific acts. To focus exclusively oi1 
this is both to carve the moral life into artificially discrete units and to 
miss the emotional element. 
Others have argued that relationships of caring for particular others 
have an import for ethics quite independent of moral obligation. It is 
no accident, but nonetheless a great mistake, that topics such as love 
and friendship have only recently come to be discussed again. These 
are aspects of the moral life one is apt to downplay, if not miss 
entirely, so long as one's focus is on moral obligation. 
But even if these various writers would agree with Anscombe that 
modern moral philosophy should end its excessive concentration on 
obligation, almost all would reject, I think, her proposal to abandon 
the conception completely. Almost all, that is, would reject the call to 
abolish morality. 
I say "almost all" because there is just now one very important 
exception. Bernard Williams argues in his most recent book, Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy, that morality is "a special system, a 
particular variety of ethical thought" that "we would be better off 
without", v Like Anscombe, he advocates abolishing morality. 
Indeed, "abolition" would seem just the word Williams wants to 
associate with his proposal. He titles the chapter containing his in- 
dictment, 'Morality, the Peculiar Institution', thereby giving morality 
the same epithet given to slavery in the antebellum American south. 8 
Taken together with Williams' earlier writings, this allusion may lead 
one to expect the charge that morality enslaves by alienating a person 
from his ground projects and so his own integrity. 9 But though 
Williams uses the rhetoric of domination liberally, his focus is less on 
the way morality may dominate individuals and more on the way, as he 
sees it, it will tend to dominate any other value, whether personal or 
part of "an ethical life that is to an important degree shared with 
others" (p. 191). Indeed, he charges, "the morality sys tem. . ,  actually 
conceals the dimension in which ethical life lies outside the individual" 
(p. 191). 
It is the burden of Williams's abolitionist case that the very idea of 
morality, with its notions of moral obligation and of a peculiarly 
"pure" sort of moral motivation, and value attaching to it, involves a 
"powerful misconception of life" (p. 196), one that, if it gains a 
foothold, improverishes life by dominance. 
In what follows I shall undertake to provide a partial defense of 
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morality against Williams' charges. Specifically, I shall argue that the 
notion of moral obligation is not subject to the defects Williams 
claims. I shall not, however, be able to take up all of Williams' 
charges. In particular, I shall not be able to discuss his charge that 
morality presupposes the illusory idea of a kind of value "that  lies 
beyond all luck" (p. 196). 
Of course, even a response to all of Williams' criticisms would not 
amount to a full justification of morality, not even of moral obligation. 
But I assume that most people are inclined to think morality, unlike 
slavery, defensible unless they can be convinced by powerful 
arguments against it. 
I should say in advance that I think Williams' charges are not 
completely unmotivated. There are many things we have reason to 
care about as part of a common life other than moral obligation and 
an ideal of character directly related to it. It is a mistake to try to 
reduce every ground or motivation for acting to the two categories of 
the moral and the (merely) personal. 1° Nonetheless, even if moral 
obligations are by their nature conceived to be authoritatively overri- 
ding, and the moral person conceived to be someone who is governed 
by them, it does not follow that morality must dominate life in the 
sense of leaving no place for the embrace and expression of other 
values. From the fact that morality dominates in the sense that its 
obligations are conceived to have overriding justificatory weight, it 
does not follow that it must dominate in the way, for example, 
someone might dominate a discussion by not allowing others to speak. 
M O R A L  O B L I G A T I O N  A N D  D O M I N A N C E  
Like Anscombe, Williams begins the argument for abolition by tying 
morality to its special notion of obligation. With one exception that I 
shall mention below, we may generally accept his characterization. 
Moral obligations: (a) apply to a person in a situation with respect to 
an action that, (b) is in the person's power. (c) If a person is under a 
moral obligation to do something, then the person must, all things 
considered, do it. And (d), if she does not, she is deserving of reproach 
(whether or not reproach would be appropriate). Finally, (e) moral 
obligations are inescapable (pp. 175-177). 
Some discussion of this last condition is necessary since Williams 
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states it in two different ways. Sometimes what he means is that moral 
obligations apply to a given agent whether or not he wants them to 
apply. There is no emigration from morality. But he also expresses the 
condition in this way: "once I am under an obligation, there is no 
escaping i t . . . "  (p. 177). This can mean something quite different; and 
for Williams' argument it must. It must mean that once an obligation 
exists it can never be defeated by any consideration other than an 
obligation of overriding weight. That moral obligations are inescap- 
able in this sense is, as we shall see, far from clear. 
Before we consider Williams' argument, it is worth pausing to 
consider how these features of moral obligation bring out the ways in 
which it is modelled on the idea of law. What a person is morally 
obligated to do is what morality requires her to do. Like legal 
requirement, moral obligation concerns not what would be advisable, 
but what one must do. Moreover, violation of moral obligation, failing 
adequate excuse, constitutes guilt and desert of reproach. And, in both 
instances, whether a person should be reproached (punished) is a 
separate question from whether it would be deserved. Finally, because 
obligations are requirements, violations of which merit reproach, it is 
only reasonable that they be limited to what people can intentionally 
do. 
Williams' major objection to moral obligation and its place in 
morality is not Anscombe's that it is simply incoherent without the 
assumption of Divine law. He does think there is a problem, to which 
we shall return below, about how moral obligations can bind even 
those who want not to be bound by them. Nonetheless, his principal 
concern is that "[i]f obligation is allowed to structure ethical thought, 
there are several natural ways in which it can come to dominate life 
al together" (p. 182). Moral  obligation comes to bind us so thoroughly 
that the moral life becomes one of bondage. 
This happens in two interrelated ways, he thinks. First, there is 
pressure within the "morality system" to represent everything relevant 
to ethical choice th rough  the prism of its special concept. " I t  is a 
mistake of morality to try to make everything into obligations" (p. 
180). Moral obligation becomes the dominant category of ethical 
deliberation. 
But if it dominates in this way it will also dominate in a second. The 
number of things we are obligated to do will so expand that "we may 
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begin to get into t rouble . . ,  finding room for morally indifferent 
actions" (p. 181). Morality will dominate our lives in the sense that we 
will be bound by it at every turn. 
Now it is not immediately plain why morality must involve either 
form of dominance. And, actually, Williams never says it m u s t .  
Rather, he argues that morality has an inherent tendency to dominate. 
But this claim, though more credible, is more problematic in the 
context of an argument for abolition. Even if it is true that "dominat- 
ing" tendencies are inherent in morality, there may be other ten- 
dencies, also inherent in morality, that keep them in check. 
But why does Williams think that morality has even a tendency to 
dominate in any sense but the obvious one that it must claim that a 
moral obligation to do something has overriding justificatory weight? 
Why does he suppose that morality tends to make every consideration 
with any justificatory weight at all into a moral obligation and so 
thoroughly hedge us in? 
Williams comes to this conclusion because he thinks that morality 
"encourages" adherence to two fundamental ideas. First, thinking 
within the terms of morality leads one to think that if a moral 
obligation exists, other things equal, to do something, then the 
only thing that could make it true that there is no moral obligation so 
to act, all things considered, is a more stringent obligation to act 
otherwise. Second, if a person has a moral obligation to do something 
particular in some particular circumstance, that must be because 
anyone has a general obligation to do that kind of thing. The first idea 
is expressed in the slogan "only an obligation can beat an obligation". 
And the second he calls the "obligation-out, obligation-in principle". 
The dialectic that leads Williams to these ideas and to moral 
obligation's unacceptable obtrusiveness is as follows. He begins by 
describing a situation in which one is under an obligation to visit a 
friend because of a promise, but then is "presented with a unique 
opportunity, at a conflicting time and place, to further significantly 
some important cause" (p. 180). 11 He asks us to imagine that the 
promise and the cause are such that "you may reasonably conclude 
that you should take the opportunity to further the cause". 
So far there is nothing that anyone but an absolutist about promises 
could not accept. But, Williams argues, there will be a cost. "[O]bli- 
gations have a moral stringency, which means that breaking them 
attracts blame". So "[t]he only thing that can be counted on to cancel 
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this, within the economy of morality, is that the rival action should 
represent another and more stringent obligation". From this he draws 
the conclusion: "[m]orality encourages the idea, only an obligation 
can beat an obligation" (p. 180). 12 In order to hold that one should 
break a promise one would otherwise be morally obligated to keep to 
further an important cause, the moralist must then believe there is a 
more stringent moral obligation to further that cause. 
But what does this more stringent conflicting obligation result 
from? An obligation to further this particular important cause on this 
particularly propitious occasion could only arise, presumably, because 
of some more general obligation, perhaps to "assist some important 
cause on occasions that are specially propitious for assisting it". This, 
then, is the second idea that morality encourages: any particular moral 
obligation is backed by a general one. The reasoning leading to a 
specific moral obligation as conclusion requires a general obligation as 
premise. Obligation-out, obligation-in. 
The cost of accepting there to be cases where one should not do 
what would otherwise be obligatory is that the moralist must then hold 
there to be stronger conflicting obligations resulting from fairly 
powerful general obligations. 
And once we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various 
moral objectives . . . .  they will be waiting to provide work for idle hands, and the 
thought can gain a footing (I am not saying that it has to) that I could be better 
employed than in doing something I am under no obligation to do, and if I could be, 
then I ought to be. I am under an obligation not to waste time in doing things I am 
under no obligation to do. ~3 
So the real cost to the moralist is that she will then be committed to 
holding there to be almost no cases where general moral obligations 
do not plausibly apply. We will always be bound by morality. 
There are two important steps in Williams' argument. First, there is 
the step from the moralist's acceptance of the case to the principle she 
is "encouraged" to embrace to justify her acceptance: only an 
obligation can beat an obligation. Second, there is the step from 
accepting general moral obligations to the obtrusiveness of moral 
obligation. There is also a step from particular moral obligations to 
general ones, but it will emerge, I think, that this is not very important 
by itself. Let us take these two steps one at a time. 
Williams is right, surely, to think that both moral common sense and 
moral theory will want to allow that where one is morally obligated, 
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other things equal or "prima facie", to do something, one may not be 
so obligated all things considered. We may accept his example as such 
a case. A promise that would otherwise morally obligate may no 
longer do so in light of a particularly important conflicting objective. TM 
This much is uncontroversial. 
But this is only part of the first step. It is also claimed that morality 
encourages the idea that the only way a prima facie moral obligation 
can no longer bind in such a case is by virtue of another, more 
stringent obligation. Thus, to take Williams' case, it is claimed that, 
given the existence of a prima facie obligation to keep one's promise, 
the fact that a unique opportunity exists to further significantly some 
important cause makes it false that one is morally obligated to keep 
the promise only if there exists a stronger prima facie duty to further 
the cause. 
Now it must be admitted that some moralists have apparently had 
this picture. Ross is probably the best example, as the language of the 
last paragraph should remind us. A prima facie duty, for Ross, 
becomes an actual duty unless there exists some more "incumbent" 
prima facie duty to act otherwise. 15 But there seems nothing in the 
notion of moral obligation to require, or even encourage, this picture. 
And indeed, moral common sense, and some quite respectable moral 
theories, explicitly deny it. 
To begin with, it is widely accepted that one is not obligated to do 
many things one would otherwise be morally obligated to do, if doing 
them would require personal sacrifice, or even sacrifice to loved ones, 
beyond some rough threshold, even though it would not be wrong to 
do what would otherwise be obligatory and incur the sacrifice. So, for 
example, what one is morally required to do by the duty of mutual aid 
is ordinarily thought to depend on how much sacrifice would be 
involved. Moreover, it is denied that it would be morally acceptable to 
fail to make the sacrifice just in case it would be wrong to make it. 
Put in the language of prima facie duties, this means that a prima 
facie duty can be cancelled without being overridden by a more 
incumbent duty, say, a duty to oneself. It can be defeated by con- 
siderations of personal sacrifice. 16 That this is part of moral common 
sense seems clear. It is also generally thought, for reasons I shall 
mention below, to be dictated by rule-consequentialist and rule- 
contraetarian theories of right. 
Before we consider Williams' case in this connection, however, let 
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us consider a case that is intermediate between his case and the sort of 
case just discussed. Frances Kamm has crafted a case that brings 
together features of famous examples of Ross and Judith Thomson. 17 
Suppose A makes a promise to B to meet for lunch. On the way to 
lunch A encounters an awful automobile accident whose victim needs 
aid. (Thus far Ross.) The aid required, as it happens, involves 
significant personal sacrifice, say, the donation of a kidney. (Thus far 
Thomson.) 
Now, on the one hand, it seems unreasonable to expect A to donate 
his kidney. The sacrifice involved is sufficiently great that he ap- 
parently has no duty to do so. But though he is not morally required to 
donate his kidney, neither would it be wrong for him to do so were he 
willing. Far from it. It would be absurd to say that since the only 
moral obligation A has is to keep his promise to B, he must keep 
that promise since it is not overridden by some weightier obligation. 
Further features of the situation defeat an all things considered moral 
obligation to keep the promise to B, even if they do not create an 
overriding obligation to do something else. 
Of course, this situation is different from those mentioned earlier. 
The accident victim's plight does not cancel the obligation to keep the 
promise in the same way that considerations of personal, sacrifice 
cancel what would otherwise be an obligation to aid the victim. 
(Assume the only further help he needs is the kidney.) If A declines to 
help the victim, he had better keep his promise. The moral com- 
plication created for A by the victim's plight is that whereas before he 
was simply obligated to keep his promise to B, he is now obligated 
either to do that or to help the victim. He acts wrongly only if he does 
neither. 18 
It would seem, then, that it can frequently happen that a moral 
obligation to do something can be cancelled by further features of a 
situation other than an overriding obligation to act otherwise. What 
about the sort of case Williams describes, however? Here keeping a 
promise conflicts with the significant advancement of a cause whose 
importance is such that it can be "reasonably conclude[d]" that one 
"shou ld . . .  further the cause". 
Now it must be granted that if the force of "should" is that it would 
be wrong not to further the cause, then the moralist will of course be 
committed to the existence of an overriding moral obligation. And 
just as surely, tl~ere will be cases where this would seem just the right 
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conclusion to come to. Some causes are sufficiently important that if a 
significant enough contribution could be made to them without too 
great a personal cost and at no greater moral cost than a nontrivial, 
but nonvital, broken promise, it would be wrong not to advance them 
at that cost. 
But not every case where one can reasonably conclude that one 
should promote a cause rather than keep a promise is one where it 
would be wrong not to do so. It may be that the situation is that of A 
and B above, with the added feature that A is willing to donate his 
kidney to B. Since he is willing to bear the cost, he concludes he 
should do so; given his priorities that is what would be advisable. But 
he may also conclude that it is not obligatory since no one could 
reasonably be expected to bear the cost. 
Or it may be that a cause, say a political ideal, or ideal of life to 
which one is committed, or even the welfare of a friend, is sufficiently 
important to an individual that not to further it in the requisite way 
would involve a sacrifice we cannot reasonably expect people to make 
in furthering their own conceptions of the good. Given its importance 
to him the individual might reasonably conclude that he is morally 
permitted to further the cause, and that he should do so and not keep 
the promise, even though it would not be wrong for him not to do so. 
If these possibilities are consistent with morality, then why does 
Williams think that morality tends otherwise? Why does he think that 
a prima facie obligation can only be defeated by a more stringent 
obligation? The reason he gives is that since obligations have a "moral 
stringency" that consists in their relation to deserved reproach, "the 
only thing that can be counted on to cancel this" is a rival, more 
stringent obligation (p. 180). But this feature of moral obligations can 
be turned against Williams. Surely it is precisely because the violation 
of a moral obligation is a serious business, making a person liable to 
blame, that the moralist must be careful not to claim moral obligations 
to exist beyond what can reasonably be expected of people. 
This point has been emphasized by the tradition Kurt Baier 
represents. If moral obligation is taken to be defined by reproach- 
governing rules, the inculcation and teaching of which are "in the 
interest of everyone alike", there will be a strong case for the sorts of 
"defeaters" of obligation discussed above. It simply is not in every- 
one's interests to be considered deserving of reproach if they fail to 
make efforts beyond some rough level of expected sacrifice. The same 
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would seem to be true whether the standard for the rules is that they 
maximize utility, be choiceworthy from an original position, could not 
reasonably be rejected by people motivated by the desire for reason- 
able agreement, or would result from a rational bargain among all. 
There will only always seem a need to admit a further obligation to 
cancel a prima facie one if the moralist fails to keep in mind Williams' 
own point that an actual moral obligation is an "all things considered" 
conclusion and not simply one consideration among others in moral 
deliberation. Williams obscures this when he writes that because of the 
moral stringency of obligations only a more stringent obligation can 
be counted on to cancel an obligation. This confuses the "all things 
considered" moral obligation, violation of which is deserving of 
reproach, with prima facie obligations. Violating a prima faeie obliga- 
tion appropriately incurs reproach only if other things are equal, and 
there are more ways other things may be unequal than through the 
existence of a more stringent rival obligation. 
Morality, therefore, neither requires, nor evidently encourages, the 
first step. Nonetheless, there may well be cases where almost any 
moralist would hold it wrong, and not simply inadvisable, for a person 
to fail to break a promise to further a cause. Where does the moralist 
land if she takes this step? Is she then on a road leading to ubiquitous 
obligations that partition all, or almost all, choices into the morally 
required and the morally forbidden? 
It is true that once morality recognizes obligations to further causes, 
even to relieve suffering, it extends the obligatory beyond the range of 
omissions and voluntarily assumed bonds such as contract. A person 
cannot then do what is morally obligatory simply by failing to harm or 
defraud others or to violate agreements he voluntarily made. This will 
mean that a person's obligations will cease to be within his explicit 
control in an obvious sense~ Mere circumstance can make it true that 
he morally must do something. A morality with positive obligations is 
more restrictive than one that lacks them. 
But the obligations to render aid, to relieve suffering, to cooperate 
with others on fair terms, and so on, need not absorb the permissible 
nor even restrict it unreasonably. Indeed, each can be cast so that a 
sphere of "agent 's  prerogative" is maintained if it is understood that 
they can be defeated by considerations of personal sacrifice beyond 
some rough level. This is, I believe, how they are understood in moral 
common sense. And it is the way they are conceived in the tradition 
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that sees moral obligations as constituted by "reproach-governing" 
rules the general acceptance of which is validated by some such 
standard as "the interest of everyone alike". As far as I can see, the 
only reason to think morality tends in the direction of ubiquitous 
obligation is if one really does think that a prima facie obligation can 
only be cancelled by an overriding obligation. 
Interestingly enough, Williams himself believes that we should 
recognize obligations (he refuses to call them "moral") and correlative 
rights that one "cannot ignore without blame" (p. 186). Like almost 
any moralist, he says that obligation "is grounded in the basic issue of 
what people should be able to rely on" (p. 185). And he includes 
under this rubric the traditional negative obligations and obligations to 
aid when the need is "immediate". 
How does all this differ in substance from the status that moral 
obligations are ordinarily thought to have and are accorded by 
Baier's tradition? The differences one might have expected are simply 
not there. Williams speaks of the sort of obligation he embraces as 
having, like moral obligation, "deliberative priority". And he relates 
obligation to deserved reproach in the same way. In both cases, when 
an obligation exists, it must be discharged on pain of deserving 
reproach. 
One potential difference concerns the scope of the obligatory. 
Williams includes only positive obligations that are "immediate". But 
by itself that need involve no difference in the concept of obligation. 
And, in any case, Williams admits that "immediacy" is itself a con- 
tested concept and that "we must consider what for us, in the modern 
world, should properly count as immediacy. . . "  (p. 186). 
What Williams really considers to distinguish his proposal from the 
traditional notion of moral obligation is that it is not committed to the 
two "principles" of morality: "only an obligation can beat an obliga- 
tion" and "obligation out, obligation in". If an emergency creates an 
obligation for A to aid B, "what produces an obligation. . ,  is, pre- 
cisely, the emergency" (p. 186). We are not required to recognize a 
general obligation to aid that can only be cancelled by a stronger 
obligation. But, as I have argued, so much is true for moral obligation 
also. 
I conclude, therefore, that nothing in the idea of moral obligation 
tends to make it a dominating presence in our lives. This is not to say 
that no moralists have held moral obligation to dominate in these 
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ways, only that there is nothing in the idea of moral obligation that 
requires or even encourages it. Moral obligations dominate only in the 
straightforward sense that when they exist morality recognizes no 
adequate justification for their violation, only excuse. 
M O R A L  O B L I G A T I O N  A N D  A U T H O R I T Y  
Even if moral obligation can be defended against the dominance 
objection, it may well face problems on other fronts, and Williams 
thinks that it does. It is central to the idea of moral obligation that it is 
supposed to be inescapable: it applies to a person whether she wants it 
to or not. But what does the peculiar authority of morality derive 
from? How can it bind even those who would not be bound? Why is 
there no emigration from morality? 
It is Williams' view that the idea of an obligation with this sort of 
authority is illusory. In this concluding section I shall try to indicate 
how a defense of morality's authority might most successfully be 
mounted. Williams gives no general argument that morality cannot 
have the authority it claims. He merely indicates some reasons for 
being skeptical and issues a challenge. Likewise, I cannot here provide 
a general argument that moral obligations are inescapable. I shall be 
content to point to directions in which such an argument might be 
found. 
As Philippa Foot has pointed out, there is an unproblematic, but 
superficial sense in which moral obligations can be held to be inescap- 
able. 19 Just as we can think of norms of etiquette as applying, to 
anyone whether they want them to or not, so also can we think of 
morality. But there is another sense in which we think a person may 
nonetheless not be obligated by a norm of etiquette even if it applies. 
So even if we think moral norms apply to everyone, we are not 
entitled to conclude that a person is thereby genuinely obligated. 
But when we reflect on what we mean when we say that someone 
might not be obligated by a norm of etiquette even if it applies, it 
seems the only thing we can mean is that he is not morally obligated: 
that it would not be wrong, perhaps not even prima facie, for him to 
violate it. s° This suggests that when it comes to morality we no longer 
have any critical space left to consider the possibility that someone 
might not really be obligated to do what morality requires of him. 
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How could a person not really be obligated to do what morality 
requires if really obligated is morally obligated? 
This defense of the no emigration thesis is too facile, however. Even 
if it is not possible to question whether people are really obligated if 
they are morally obligated, there are other ways in which the authority 
of moral claims can be questioned. For one thing, the validity of moral 
obligation claims can themselves be questioned. Is it ever true that a 
person is obligated in the way we suppose when we say he is morally 
obligated? An adequate answer will ultimately require some account 
of the truth or assertability conditions of moral obligation claims and a 
showing that at least some moral obligation claims are true and/or 
assertable with warrant. 
Now there are well known problems with providing such an ac- 
count, but there seem to me to be two main alternatives. One is a 
moral realism, either of a naturalist or nonnaturalist sort. Naturalist 
moral realisms seek to discover truth conditions for moral claims in a 
natural order of which we are a part and with which we can have 
cognitive, and other causal contact. 21 Nonnaturalist realists also be- 
lieve that moral claims have truth conditions, but in an independent 
moral order that is not a natural o rde rY 
Although it is not strictly necessary, moral realisms tend to be 
externalist. They tend to hold, that is, that a person's being bound by 
an ultimate principle of obligation is independent of any fact regarding 
his motivational capacities or whether he would rationally choose, 
under specified conditions, the principle as binding. 
The second main alternative is internalist in this same general sense. 
It holds that for a person to be morally obligated, it must be the case 
that the principles b y  which he is bound can, in some appropriate 
sense, spring from him. Within the contractarian tradition, the key 
idea is that principles of moral obligation are rationally choiceworthy 
from an appropriate s tandpointY 
Both of these alternatives are currently being vigorously pursued. 
Absent a showing that neither can succeed, and that no further 
alternatives exist, it would be premature to conclude that claims of 
moral obligation simply cannot have the sort of backing they must 
have to apply even to would-be emigrees. 
So far I have presented these alternatives evenhandedly. There is, 
however, another aspect of the notion of moral obligation as Williams 
presents it that may force a choice between them. 
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Williams believes that the claim that someone is under a moral 
obligation is closely connected to the claim that she has thereby a 
reason so to act. The  connect ion runs, he thinks, through the concept  
of blame. To  be under a moral obligation is to be deserving of blame if 
one acts otherwise; and blame involves the assumption that the agent 
could have done otherwise in a strong sense. It assumes not just that 
she would have if she had chosen, but that she was free to choose in 
the sense that the choice she is blamed for not making would have 
been a rational choice for her. It would have been a choice sup- 
ported by reasons she had. 
Now, not all moralists will agree that blame assumes any such thing. 
But suppose we accept this thesis. Suppose we agree that for an act to 
be morally obligatory it must be supported thereby by reasons for the 
agent to act. Are we then committed to Williams' conclusion that " the  
institution of blame is best seen as involving a fiction, by which we 
treat the agent as one for whom the relevant ethical considerations are 
reasons" (p. 193). Is this indeed a fiction? 
Two points must be noted. First, Williams distinguishes between 
there being a reason for someone to act and someone's having a 
reason to act. Moral obligation claims assume not only that a reason 
thereby exists, but that the agent has it. Second, whether a person has 
a reason in the requisite sense depends on his motivational state. 
Thus Williams is arguing that blame assumes that the person blamed 
has reasons in the sense required by an internalist account of reasons. 
(Note that some moralists who would agree that obligation creates, or 
is the mark of, reasons to act, will deny this internalist premise.) Blame 
assumes that the considerations we give in justifying reproach can 
catch hold of the agent as motivating reasons for him to act. But this 
threatens the inescapability of moral obligation. For whether a person 
is really morally obligated will depend on his motivational state. 
But we must be careful here. Even  if blame presupposes something 
about the agent 's motivational state, it may not presuppose anything 
that undermines inescapability. To  begin with, it seems obvious that in 
blaming a person we certainly do not assume that his dominant desire 
is to do what is morally obligatory, or to perform acts with charac- 
teristic M, where M acts are prima facie obligatory. If there is a 
connect ion between blame and assumed motivation it must be much 
weaker than that. 
The  only connect ion that seems plausible is one between blame and 
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motivational capacity or susceptibility. Blaming may well seem point- 
less if the person blamed is simply incapable of responding to it and 
the considerations given to justify its desert, e4 But it may be quite 
consistent with a person's being morally bound only if she has the moti- 
vational capacities that give blame point, that whether a person is morally 
bound 1s qmte independent of whether she wants to be. 
Even a person who does not want to be bound by morality may have 
emotional responses and motivational susceptibilities that are, in some 
sense, implicitly moral, responses such as resentment, moral indig- 
nation, respect, contempt, even blame itself. Moreover, if we regard 
moral obligation in the rule-contractualist way, this will provide an- 
other source of potential motivation. A person may be able to consider 
whether she would rationally prefer the general acceptance of a rule 
from a point of view impartial between herself and others, from a 
moral point of view. 25 She will then have motivation, from that 
standpoint, for preferring that people discharge their moral obliga- 
tions. This, of course, is not the same thing as wanting herself to do 
what is morally obligatory. But it may lead to that motivation in a 
natural way; it is a motivational susceptibility that provides some 
leverage. 
Granting that blame requires a connection between moral obliga- 
tion and potential motivation, then, apparently does not undermine 
the inescapability of morality. A philosophical account of moral obli- 
gation, such as rule-contractualism aims to give, may provide a 
"demystification" of morality that, nonetheless, does not relegate the 
connection between moral obligation and reasons to the realm of 
fiction. 
There is the risk, in responding to the sort of attack Williams 
mounts, of sounding a note of complacency. This would be a mistake. 
There is much that is problematic both in our ordinary moral ideas 
and in even our best philosophical accounts of morality. And, as I said 
at the outset, even an adequate response to all of Williams' objections 
(which I have not attempted) would not provide a positive justification 
of morality, or even of moral obligation. My goal has been much more 
limited. By arguing that several specific objections to the concept of 
moral obligation can be met, or, at least, that it is far from clear that 
they cannot be met, I have tried to show that these objections provide 
little reason to believe that morality is an institution "we would be 
better off without". 
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